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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20020063-SC
G. KAY INC.,
Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellant.

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY OF SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS, MORGAN AND WEBER COUNTIES,
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE GLENN R. DAWSON.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appellee, Utah Department of Transportation, by and through counsel, submits the
following brief:
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This action arises out of a condemnation proceeding initiated by the Plaintiff, Utah
Department of Transportation (UDOT), against parcels of real property owned by
Defendant, G. Kay, Inc. in Davis County in connection with the Legacy Highway project.
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The parcels include land within the roadway right-of-way and also wetlands within the
planned Legacy Parkway Project, which the state needed both to mitigate the impacts of
highway construction and to meet the requirements of federal wetlands mitigation law,
and for wildlife protection. Although defendant has stipulated to occupancy and
condemnation of the parcel(s) underlying the roadway, it contests the state's right to
condemn the parcels needed for wetlands mitigation and the other purposes described
above.
UDOT's Complaint and Motion for Immediate Occupancy were filed in the
Second Judicial District Court on June 20, 2001. (R. 1-21). Defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy
and the Affidavit of Kia F. Hodgson (R 28) on June 29, 2001 (R. 22-32) claiming that
UDOT had not satisfied the conditions precedent to taking under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-4 (1996). In response, UDOT filed an Affidavit of Byron Parker, Legacy
Parkway Project Director (R. 46-156), and a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate
Occupancy (R. 168-195). Following a period of discovery (R. 162-166), the court held an
evidentiary hearing on the motions on November 9, 2001 (R. 224-225) which, by result
of earlier stipulations (R. 209-211), was limited to UDOT's right to take the contested
parcels. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court granted UDOT's Motion for
Immediate Occupancy, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. 225), and subsequently
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entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 234-236) and an Order of
Immediate Occupancy (R. 256-258). Defendant filed a timely Petition for Permission to
File Interlocutory Order on January 25, 2002 (R. 276-281). This Court has jurisdiction
over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2001) as a case not within
the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1.

The District Court correctly concluded in its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law that the acquisition of property for mitigation constitutes an
authorized, lawful basis for condemnation.
2.

The District Court correctly concluded in its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law that the mitigation property sought in this action may be lawfully
occupied or acquired by the Utah Department of Transportation as necessary and requisite
to a state transportation purpose.
3.

The District Court correctly determined each finding of fact found in its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The trial court's granting of the Motion for Immediate Occupancy involved "both
factual and legal determinations. [The Supreme Court] review[s] the trial court's factual
findings for clear error. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). [The
Supreme Court] review[s] the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according no
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deference to the trial court. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.. 870
P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). In addition, an appellant must properly marshal the evidence
to permit review of the trial court's findings. Alta Indus. Ltd., 846 P.2d at 1286." Timm
v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381, 1391 (Utah 1996).
The standard for reviewing the court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
not so simple. The parties offered, and the court considered, matters outside the
pleadings, including the Parker Affidavit and the sworn testimony at the hearing. It did
not consider, however, the Affidavit of Kia F. Hodgson, to which the state had objected
(R. 28). Rule 12(b) requires the trial court to consider such a motion under the provisions
of Rule 56. Denial of summary judgment must be sustained where the court finds a
genuine issue as to any material fact, or where the movant is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, which the court reviews for correctness.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to issues
before the Court is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This action arises out of a condemnation proceeding initiated by Plaintiff, the Utah

Department of Transportation (UDOT), in which UDOT seeks land from Defendant G.
Kay, Inc. for the Legacy Highway Project and Legacy Nature Preserve. UDOT's
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Complaint and Motion for Immediate Occupancy were filed in the Second Judicial
District Court on June 20, 2001 (R. 1-21).
Defendant responded with a Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs
Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy on June 29, 2001 (R. 22-32) on grounds that
UDOT had not satisfied the conditions precedent to taking under Utah Code Ann. § 7834-4, including a claim that mitigation was not included as a "highway purpose" under
Utah code Ann. § 72-3-102 (2001) (R 22 - 32). Subsequently, UDOT filed an Affidavit
of Byron Parker, Legacy Project Director (R 46 - 156) on August 9, 2001, and a
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Deny
Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy on September 17, 2001 (R. 168195) in which UDOT argued that Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 had been amended
effective March 9, 2001 to specifically provide for mitigation of impacts from
transportation projects, that condemnation of Defendant's property was necessary to an
authorized public purpose, and that cooperation with federal officials was irrelevant to
disposition of any issues before the Court.
Following discovery (R. 162-166), an evidentiary hearing on the motions took
place on November 9, 2001 (R. 224-225). As a result of a prior Stipulation for Order of
Immediate Occupancy as to right-of-way property, however, the November 9 hearing (R.
224-225) was limited to UDOT's right to take Defendant's property for mitigation. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court granted UDOT's Motion for Immediate
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Occupancy, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and stated its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 225). The Court subsequently entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 234-236) and an Order of Immediate Occupancy (R. 256-258) on
January 14, 2002. Defendant thereupon filed a timely Petition for Permission to File
Interlocutory Appeal on January 25, 2002 (R. 276-281).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The Legacy Parkway Project, out of which this action arises, is a state funded

transportation project encompassing a highway of approximately 14 miles between 1-215
in North Salt Lake and the I-15/U.S. 89 Interchange in Farmington, and land for the
Legacy Nature Preserve of approximately 2,100 acres (R. 47). As described in UDOT's
Condemnation Resolution, Defendant's property of approximately 32.71 acres is sought
for the purpose of mitigating the impacts from a public transportation project and
mitigating the effects of construction as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 (R. 5-8).
During its 2001 legislative session, the Utah Legislature authorized and appropriated
funds for acquisition of property and construction of the Legacy Project (R. 48). The
Legacy Nature Preserve was proposed by the Governor and UDOT to accommodate the
interests of the state of Utah in the protection of wetlands, wildlife habitat, and other
natural resource values (R. 47). As originally proposed and described in UDOT's
application to the Army Corps of Engineers for a permit under Section 404, the Legacy
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Nature Preserve had approximately 1,298 acres, but was later expanded to approximately
2,100 acres (R. 47-48).
In order to connect with the Interstate Highway and National Highway Systems at
each terminus, approval was needed from the Federal Highway Administration (R. 48).
Also, because the Legacy Parkway involves the filling of wetlands regulated under the
Clean Water Act, a permit was required from the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers under
Section 404 of the Act (R. 48). The objectives of the Legacy Nature Preserve include
providing lands to mitigate the Project's impact to wetlands, wildlife, and open space by
acquiring and preserving lands identified as important wetlands and adjacent uplands in
the area of the Project, and by acquiring and preserving for later improvement lands that
are susceptible to being adapted for wildlife and wetland habitat (R. 49-50).
The contested 32.71 acres of G. Kay mitigation property at issue here was added
on to the original 1,298 acre Legacy Nature Preserve in order to help meet or satisfy 404
Permit requirements (R. 50). The property was selected because it was suitable for the
Preserve and contiguous to other areas that Utah considered suitable (R. 50). In
accordance with the mitigation plan prepared to mitigate the effects of highway
construction, both direct and indirect impacts were evaluated and quantified in
accordance with accepted methodology. Hearing on Motions, November 9, 2001, TR at
23-24; 27-29; 35-36. The mitigation properties selected, including Defendant's property,
were located on the west side of the roadway as close to where impacts occurred as
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possible. TR at 30. As a property that was identified as meeting the criteria developed for
the selection of mitigation properties, TR at 47, 56-57, the G. Kay property includes both
wetlands and uplands. TR at 57. Wetlands are preserved in highest productivity when
both uplands and wetlands are taken in combination. TR at 107.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The issues properly before the Court on interlocutory appeal are limited to whether
the taking of Defendant's property for mitigation is authorized under state law and
whether the taking was necessary to an authorized public use. Other issues raised over
whether UDOT may condemn water rights, whether UDOT may acquire fee title by
eminent domain, and whether Defendant is entitled to interest on funds deposited into
court but not withdrawn were not raised in the District Court and may not be considered
for the first time on appeal. Based on the 2001 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5102, UDOT has been granted condemnation authority for purposes of mitigation. Where
a public use has been authorized by the Legislature, the law requires that the statute be
liberally construed in furtherance of that purpose. In the present case, the plain language
of the statute is clear and unambiguous and the powers delegated to UDOT are entirely
appropriate and well within established legal precedent. The District Court's findings
that the selection criteria required by the state of Utah were met, and that the taking was
requisite and reasonably necessary to an authorized state use, are based on an extensive
record of unrebutted evidence and expert testimony considered by the District Court at the
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evidentiary and motions hearing held in November 2001. None of the federal issues
raised by the Defendant in this action are relevant to this appeal. UDOT's right to
condemn is governed by state law. Moreover, the Army Corps of Engineers is not a party
to this action and jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers over wetlands may not be
determined in state court. Although the state of Utah is not precluded by law from
working and cooperating with federal agencies, UDOT has nevertheless exercised its own
discretion and judgment in determining the quality, quantity and location of property to be
selected for mitigation. Accordingly, cooperation with federal agencies in planning or
implementing mitigation does not in any way bar UDOT from selecting and taking
Defendant's property. Finally, Defendant's interpretation and application of federal law
is erroneous and does not in any way support the contention that the Army Corps of
Engineers does not have jurisdiction over wetlands located within or adjacent to the
Legacy Parkway Project.
For the foregoing reasons, and as more fully explained below, the Order and
Findings of the District Court should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

DEFENDANT HAS RAISED ISSUES NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE
COURT ON APPEAL

Based on the legal memorandums and the evidence presented by the parties at
hearing, the District Court rendered the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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Law on Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
That the acquisition of property for mitigation constitutes an
authorized, lawful basis for condemnation pursuant to U.C.A. § 72-5-102
et. seq.
2.
That funding has been budgeted and appropriated for the
acquisition of land or properties for the Legacy Highway Project.
3.
That the Legacy Highway Project is proceeding in a timely
manner in accordance with a set schedule or timetable, and that
approximately 70% or more of the required properties for the project have
already been acquired or occupied.
4.
That Defendant's property meets the selection criteria for
mitigation property required or needed by the State of Utah for the Legacy
Project and Nature Preserve.
5.
That the acquisition of Defendant's property for mitigation in
this matter is requisite and reasonably necessary to an authorized state
transportation purpose.
6.
That Defendant's property is needed by or about the end of
the year 2001.
7.
That the Court adopts and incorporates in its findings the incourt and affidavit testimony of Legacy Project Manager Byron Parker.
8.
That there is no evidence of bad faith, fraud, or any abuse of
discretion by the State of Utah or Utah Department of Transportation in this
matter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
The law governing the taking of property by the Utah
Department of Transportation for mitigation purposes in this matter
10

constitutes a state transportation purpose in accordance with U.C.A. § 72-5101 et. seq.1
2.
Acquisition of the mitigation property sought in this action
may be lawfully occupied or acquired by the Plaintiff, Utah Department of
Transportation, as necessary and requisite to a state transportation purpose.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (R. 282-284).
Defendant's counsel approved as to form (R. 36) and did not contest the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the District Court, including (2) that funding
has been budgeted and appropriated; (3) that Legacy was proceeding in a timely manner;
(4) that Defendant's property met the selection criteria needed for Legacy; (7)
incorporation in findings of affidavit and in-court testimony of Byron Parker; and, (8) no
evidence of bad faith, fraud, or abuse of discretion. Under the jurisprudence of Utah's
appellate courts, "[i]ssues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and
abandoned." American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930P.2d 1182, 1185
n.5 (Utah 1996) (Citing Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 809 P.2d 746, 751
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also Pasquin v. Pasquin, 988 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting American Towers). Further, pointing out these omissions in a response does not
permit Defendant to cure them in their reply brief. See State v. Kruger, 6 P.3d 1116,
1120 (Utah 2000) (where State observed that appellant had failed to raise issues in his
opening brief, "[tjhat observation by the State did not constitute a 'new matter' entitling

]

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the District Court mistakenly cited to
§75-5-101.
11

[appellant] to brief the issue in his reply brief). The foregoing Findings of Fact may also
be deemed conclusive on grounds that Defendant has failed to marshal evidence to
"demonstrate that the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence." Saunders v.
Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
More importantly, the very need for and existence of genuine issues of material
fact preclude this court from reversing the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for
summary judgment dismissing the case. At the hearing below, Defendant's counsel
agreed that the only issues before the Court were whether the taking was authorized by
State law and whether the taking was necessary to an appropriate purpose:
THE COURT: How will this (examination regarding legislative process)
help me with regard to the matter before the Court. . . whether the taking is
authorized by State law and whether the taking is necessary for appropriate
purpose?
MR. FADEL: That's true, your honor. . . .
THE COURT: I think those are the only issues before me.
MR. FADEL: That's true
TR at 99.
Despite the foregoing representation, Defendant has raised issues not properly
before this Court, including an issue at paragraph 4 of its Statement of Issues for Review,
over "[w]hether UDOT's power of eminent domain extends to private water rights (R. 6-
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7)." The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law make no reference to
"water rights," and Defendant's record designation at "R 6-7" references "water rights"
only in the context of UDOT's Condemnation Resolution. Thus, no record has been
shown that any issue over water rights was ever preserved for appeal. As stated by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Shire Dev. v. Frontier Inv., 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), "[w]e have reiterated many times, we will not consider an issue raised on appeal
for the first time." Further, in addition to making factual representations which are
neither cited to nor supported by the record, Defendant has made no attempt to show or
explain how the District Court allegedly erred, as required by Ut. R. App. P. 24 (a)(9)
(2001). But even on the merits, the contention that UDOT has no right to acquire water
rights is baseless, because Utah Code Ann. §63-11-17 (1997) is applicable to the powers
and duties of the Board and Division of Parks and Recreation, and has no application to
UDOT. In fact, under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(1), UDOT is specifically authorized
to acquire any real property interests, without limitation:
"The department may acquire any real property or interests in real property
necessary for temporary, present, or reasonable future state transportation
purposes by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or
otherwise."
Inasmuch as water rights clearly constitute a property interest subject to
condemnation, the statutory authority and cases cited by Defendant in its argument have
no bearing on UDOT's right to condemn water rights and need not be considered on
appeal.
13

Defendant's Statement of Issues, paragraph 3, alleges: "[ W]hether paragraph 4 of
the Order of Immediate Occupancy that 'the funds as deposited do not incur interest, and
in the event Defendant does not withdraw said funds, the Defendant shall waive interest
or otherwise obtain an Order of the Court providing for payment of funds into an interest
bearing account' . . . is constitutional or otherwise proper." Here again, there is no
Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law on this issue, and no showing that any such issue
was ever raised below, either at hearing or by motion. With regard to record
designations, "R 256 - 258" is the Order of Immediate Occupancy, signed by the District
Court and approved as to form by Defendant's counsel; "R 268," is Defendant's
"Objection to Paragraph Four of Proposed Order of Immediate Occupancy;" and "R 274"
is a letter to the Clerk of the District Court transmitting a deposit fee to the court clerk for
transfer into an interest bearing account of the "$370,308.00 previously deposited with
the clerk by UDOT, representing the appraised value of the Defendant's property.
None of the above citations to the record raises the issue presently claimed, nor is
there any motion or request for ruling on an issue over whether deposit of funds was
"constitutional or otherwise proper," as now raised for the first time on appeal. "It is a
well established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is
generally barred from raising it for the first time on appeal." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); and State
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Cl. App. 1991)). The reason that an appellate
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court generally will not review an issue not raised in the Court below " . . . is based, in
part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the trial Court for failing to rule correctly on
an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider." Ellis v. Swensen, 16 P.3d 1233,
1241 (Utah 2000).
At Point IV of its brief, Defendant raises an argument captioned: "The Legacy
Nature Preserve is Not a Public Use for Which UDOT can Acquire Fee Title by Eminent
Domain." This in turn is followed by a single sentence assertion which states that, "A
Legacy Nature Preserve for which wildlife to the exclusion of the people (public) and
domestic animals is not a purpose for which UDOT could acquire fee title to G. Kay,
Inc.'s land, and if otherwise permissible to be acquired by UDOT, the estate taken can
only be an easement for public use. See Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-2(2)."
Because the above "argument" is essentially an unsupported assertion, Defendant
has effectively waived the right to consideration of the alleged issue on appeal. As stated
in U.S. v. DunkeL 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991), "A skeletal 'argument,' really
nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim." Further, "[a] reviewing court
is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not
simply a depository in which [a party] may dump the burden of argument and research."
Ellis v. Swensen, 16 P.3d 1233, 1238 (Utah 2000) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. OpsahL 416 N.E. 2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981)).
Finally, as stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549
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(Utah Ct. App. 1998), "Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed
arguments." But even on the merits, Defendant's reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78-342(2), which is cited for the proposition that UDOT cannot acquire fee title, is misplaced,
because the statutory authority for condemnation in the present case falls under the
"Rights-of-way Act," which reads at Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(2)(a)(i) as follows:
(2)(a)(i) Title to real property acquired by the department or the
counties, cities, and towns by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase,
condemnation, or otherwise for highway rights-of-way or other
transportation purposes may be in fee simple or any lesser estate or
interest.

POINT II.

CONDEMNATION OF MITIGATION PROPERTY IS AUTHORIZED
UNDER UTAH LAW

UDOT's authority to condemn for mitigation as a "state transportation purpose"
under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 (2001) could not be more clear. The plain language of
this section, which was amended effective March 9, 2001, and thus applied to the instant
Resolution of Condemnation dated April 17, 2001 (R. 8) specifically provides for
mitigation as follows:
As used in this part, "state transportation purposes" includes:
* * *

(2) the construction, reconstruction, relocation, improvement,
maintenance, and mitigation from the effects of these activities on
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state highways and other transportation facilities under the control of
the department;
* * *

(12) the mitigation of impacts from public transportation projects.
(Emphasis added)
Based on UDOT's Complaint and Condemnation Resolution (R. 1-8), Defendant's
property was sought "for the purpose of mitigating the impacts of construction . . . on
state highways, or the mitigation of impacts from public transportation projects . . .
subject to acquisition under S.B. 256, Transportation Amendments . . . " Moreover, Utah
Code Ann. § 72-1-201(4) provides an additional mandate that UDOT "plan, develop,
construct, and maintain state transportation systems that are safe, reliable, [and]
environmentally sensitive. . ." (Emphasis added)
The general statutory authority governing eminent domain, found at Utah Code
Ann. § 78-34-1, states that "the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the
following public uses":
(1) all public uses authorized by the Government of the United
States.
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other
public uses authorized by the Legislature." (Emphasis added)

Where a public use has been authorized by the legislature, the courts have held that
a "statute granting [a] right of eminent domain for [a] particular purpose must be liberally
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construed in furtherance of such purpose." Freeman Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., 119 F.2d 16, 19-20 (10th Cir. 1941). Further, a statute "must be construed,
wherein it may require construction, and applied to any particular case with as much
liberality as its language will permit in order to carry out [the] purpose which [the]
legislative power had in mind .. ." Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Haves Estate, Inc., 31
P.2d 624, 627 (Utah 1934), cert, denied, 295 U.S. 742 (1935). As stated by the United
States Supreme Court, "Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the
amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract
to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch." Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that property is taken for a public use "within
the meaning of the law when the taking is for a use which will promote the public
interest, and which use tends to develop the great natural resources of the
commonwealth." Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371, 373 (Utah 1904), aff d, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
Further, 'public use5 is determined by the character of use rather than the extent of use.
Town of Perry v. Thomas, 22 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1933). "Once a court decides that the
taking of property is for a public use, then the judicial function is exhausted, and the
extent, amount, or title of property to be taken lies within administrative determination,
subject only to the requirement that just compensation be paid." Ledford v. Corps of
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Eng'rofthe United States, 500 F.2d 26,28 (6th Cir. 1974) (relying on Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954)).
With regard to Defendant's contention that UDOT did not have authority to
condemn its property for mitigation, Defendant's argument is seemingly based, at least in
part, on the contention that UDOT lacks authority to condemn, because the Legislature
did not further define or provide guidelines regarding the terms "mitigation" and
"impacts."Notwithstanding this contention, however, Defendant has provided no
supporting case law or authority, no marshaling of facts, and no intelligible reasons or
argument as to any error on the part of the District Court. Accordingly, Defendant has
waived any right to have any such issue heard on appeal. But even on the merits, the
record suggests no reasonable basis for any claim of ambiguity over legislative intent. As
stated in People v. Matelec, 641 N.W. 2d 252, 256, 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002),
"In [construing statutes], our purpose is to discern and give effect to
the Legislature's intent. We begin by examining the plain language
of the statute; where the language is unambiguous, we presume the
meaning clearly expressed - no further judicial construction is
required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written.
We must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary
meaning, and only where statutory language is ambiguous may we
look outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent. [People
v. Morev, 461 Mich. 325, 329 330, 603 N.W. 2d 250 (1999)
(citations omitted).]
In determining the plain meaning of statutory language, "'[t]he fair
and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject
matter of the law, is what should govern' . . . and as far as possible,
effect must be given to every word, phrase, and clause in the
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statute." WL at 330, 603 N.W. 2d 250, quoting People ex rel.
Twitchell v. Blodgett. 13 Mich. 137, 168 (1865)
In the present case, Defendant has shown no ambiguity. Moreover, Defendant's
own Exhibit 7 clearly shows that the legislature granted UDOT the power to condemn for
purposes of mitigation, including wetlands mitigation. Defendant's Exhibit 7.
Defendant's Exhibit 7 is attached as Addendum A. As to Defendant's claim of an
"unlawful delegation of legislative powers," this contention is unsupported by relevant
case law or authority, and is devoid of any reasoned argument or analysis. Further,
Defendant's reliance on Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co„ 421 P.2d 504
(Utah 1966) is misplaced and has no application to the present case. In that case, the
legislature failed to spell out the area over which plaintiff was to exercise its functions,
rendering the act creating the Great Salt Lake Authority invalid. Additionally, the Act did
not identify with clarity the powers, duties, or responsibilities of the Great Salt Lake
Authority, or even include eminent domain as a means of property acquisition. By
contrast, the jurisdiction of UDOT is statewide and the powers exercised here are defined
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102, and are clearly tied in the instant case to the
Legacy Project and Nature Preserve. With regard to Utah Department of Transportation
v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978), exercise of the power of eminent domain under the
doctrine of necessary implication is not at issue in the present case because condemnation
for purposes of mitigation has been specifically authorized by statute. As set forth below,
case law and authority cited to by the Fuller court further buttress the fact that UDOT's
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selection of Defendant's property was in accordance with established legal precedent, and
that legislative delegation of powers to UDOT was likewise consistent with established
legal precedent.
[7] As to the selection of the particular site for the sewage lagoon, the
general rule was stated by this Court in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. of Utah
v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 23 Utah 474, 484, 485, 65 P. 735, 739
(1901), as follows:
It may be said to be a general rule that, unless a corporation
exercising the power of eminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty
of oppression, its discretion in the selection of land will not be
interfered with. With the degree of necessity or the extent which the
property will advance the public purpose, the courts have nothing to
do. When the use is public, the necessity or expediency of
appropriating any particular property is not a subject of judicial
cognizance. (Citations omitted).
The limitation on the scope of judicial review of the selection of sites taken
under eminent domain powers is also described in 1 Nichols on Eminent
Domain, (Hereafter Nichols), s 4.11(3), at 4-184, 4-185:
(T)he legislature may, and usually does, delegate the power of
selecting the land to be condemned to the public agent that is to do
the work; in such case it makes little, if any, difference whether the
grant of authority is, in terms, limited to such land as is "necessary"
for the purpose in view, for a general grant of authority carries the
same limitation by implication and in either case the necessity is for
the condemnor and not for the courts to decide, and the decision of
such condemnor is final as long as it acts reasonably and in good
faith. (Emphasis added)
POINT III.

CONDEMNATION OF DEFENDANT'S MITIGATION PROPERTY IS
REASONABLY NECESSARY TO AN AUTHORIZED PUBLIC USE.

Where a taking for public use is authorized by law, a determination under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-34-4 that the taking is necessary to such use "merely requires that the
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land be reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement." Williams v. Hyrum
Gibbons & Sons, 602 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1979). Under Williams, "necessity" does not
require that a project or improvement would fail without the taking of the specific land
sought, but only that the property be reasonably requisite and proper for the
accomplishment of the purpose sought. Thus, particular questions as to the route,
location, or amount of property to be taken are to be left to the sound discretion of the
condemning authority absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence that such
determinations are the product of fraud, caprice, or arbitrariness." Williams at 688. As
similarly stated in Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah
1978),
It may be said to be a general rule that, unless a corporation exercising the
power of eminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty of oppression, its
discretion in the selection of land will not be interfered with. With the
degree of necessity or the extent which the property will advance the public
purpose, the courts have nothing to do. When the use is public, the
necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular property is not a
subject of judicial cognizance.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the District Court specifically found "[t]hat Defendant's
property. . . [met] the selection criteria for mitigation property required or needed by the
State of Utah for the Legacy Project and Nature Preserve," and "[tjhat the acquisition of
Defendant's property for mitigation . . . [was] requisite and reasonably necessary to an
authorized state transportation purpose" (R. 25). The supporting evidence and testimony
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relied upon by the District Court includes unrebutted testimony from engineer and
environmental expert Richard D. Gorton, Supervisory Biologist for the Army Corps of
Engineers, Brooks Carter, and the affidavit and in-court testimony from Legacy Project
Director Byron Parker. TR at 16-141, 162-163; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, and (R. 46-157).
Mitigation is a term applied to all kinds of impacts and the term used to try to offset those
impacts. TR at 21-22. A plan was prepared for the Legacy Project which included both
wetlands and uplands. TR at 24-25. Both direct and indirect functional losses to
wetlands were quantified and wetlands scientists familiar with hydrogeomorphic (HGM)
methodology developed a series of equations that could be used to quantify both the
impact and effectiveness of mitigation. TR. at 28-29, 36. Selection of mitigation
properties, including Defendant's property, was correctly determined in accordance with
accepted methodology and met the requisite criteria for mitigation property. TR. at 30,
47. As called for by the plan, Defendant's property is located west of the highway and
close to the highway in terms of area it would impact. TR at 30.
Although Defendant contends that its property may not be taken for mitigation, it
has failed to marshal evidence pertinent to the District Court's Findings, and has further
failed to argue or explain whether or how the District Court erred in finding that the
taking met the selection criteria as a necessary taking pursuant to an authorized state
transportation purpose. As noted in Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931,
Our standard for overturning factual findings is a rigorous one - we
may not set aside such findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
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Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990); Utah
R. Civ. P. 52(a). To establish clear error, "[a]n appellant must
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'. . . . " In
re Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This burden "is a heavy one,
reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on
disputed facts." Id. at 886. Accordingly, when an appellant fails to
carry its burden of marshaling the evidence, "we refuse to consider
the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as
valid. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551,
553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Because of Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, the District Court's
Findings regarding selection criteria, and requisite, reasonably necessary acquisition must
be accepted as valid. As stated in Saunders, Id., "[w]e are . . . obliged to consider the
findings from the standpoint of the supporting evidence and not from appellant's view of
the way he or she believes the facts should have been found." (Citing Ashton v. Ashton,
733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987).)
POINT IV:

DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO RAISE ISSUES OF
FEDERAL LAW, NOR ARE FEDERAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THIS
APPEAL.

At Points II and V of its brief, Defendant raises issues of federal law which are
irrelevant to this appeal. Defendant's Point II caption reads: "The United States Supreme
Court Limits the Clean Water Act to Navigable Waters of the United States." And,
Defendant's Point V caption states: "It is Improper for UDOT to Attempt to Acquire
Land to Satisfy any Agreement It Has with Federal Agencies Even if the Agreement Were
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Enforceable." Inasmuch as Defendant's Point II fails to provide any "citation to the
record" as required by Ut. R. App. P. 24(5)(A), the issue is not preserved for appeal.
Moreover, the argument contains no intelligible statement of "contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented. . . .," but consists, rather, of an
arbitrary selection of lengthy quotations from federal cases with no accompanying
reasoning or analysis. Where no analysis is provided, this Court should decline to address
the issue on appeal and should assume the correctness of the judgment below.
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Irrespective of the inadequacy resulting from Defendant's failure to properly brief,
the Army Corps of Engineers is not a party to this action. Consequently, Defendant does
not have standing to raise or adjudicate questions of federal jurisdiction in state court over
wetlands jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers. Moreover, federal jurisdiction is
largely irrelevant because the ultimate authority and power to condemn is governed by
state law.
Given the fact that condemnation for mitigation is specifically authorized by state
law, Defendant lacks standing to challenge UDOT's exercise of discretion in working and
cooperating with federal officials or agencies. But even if such cooperation were
properly at issue, the state of Utah and UDOT have nevertheless acted lawfully to
accommodate the interests of the State of Utah in the protection of wetlands, wildlife
habitat, and other natural resource values. Further, federal agencies did not direct UDOT
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to acquire any particular mitigation property (R. 50-51). Rather, it was the state of Utah
that has proposed the quality, quantity and location for mitigation that it deemed
appropriate and feasible based on its own judgment (R. 50). Although Utah may establish
a mitigation plan that satisfies federal officials, and which also satisfies the mitigation
goals of the state, it was UDOT, not the federal government, that made a final selection
and proposal of Defendant's property for acquisition.
On the merits, Defendant's federal arguments are based on an erroneous
interpretation and application of federal law. The representation, for instance, that
"[n]one of the waters in Davis County are jurisdictional waters of the United States, and
[that] none are considered navigable waters of the United States is legally and factually
wrong. Moreover, Defendant's reliance on Hanes v. State, 973 P.2d 330 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1999), is misplaced because the case has little or no relevance to the question of
federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. The Hanes court dealt with the question
of whether a state could enforce its game and fish laws against an Indian fishing off of
tribal lands. More specifically, the case concerned treaties with the Cherokee Tribe and
the ownership interests of the tribe, the state, and the United States over the riverbed, as
opposed to the interests of any riparian property owners. Defendant's reliance on Solid
Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'r. 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) ("SWANCC"), is likewise
misplaced. And, contrary to Defendant's quotations from the case syllabus, the narrow,
specific holding in SWANCC was that the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) could not
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rely on the "Migratory Bird Rule" alone as support for an administrative finding that the
body of water at issue in that case was a jurisdictional wetland under the Clean Water
Act. Under SWANCC, the court held that the Corps of Engineers must also show a
hydrological connection to a water of the U. S. in order to establish the requisite
jurisdiction. As to "navigable waters" specifically, the SWANCC court stated:
The term "navigable waters" as defined under the Act [CWA] as
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." [33
U.S.C.] § 1362(7). The Corps has issued regulations defining the
term "waters of the United States" to include
"waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce . . . " 33
CFR § 328.3(a)(3) (1999) at 163.
Based on the foregoing, SWANCC does not turn on an understanding of
"navigable waters" in any traditional sense. Rather, the SWANCC court expressly
confirmed guidance previously provided in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), as follows: "In Riverside Bayview Homes we recognized that
"the term "navigable" is of "limited import" and that Congress evidenced its intent to
"regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical
understanding of that term." SWANCC at 167 quoting Riverside at 133. In Riverside,
the United States Supreme Court stated "that a definition of 'waters of the United States'
encompassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has
jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of the Act." Riverside at 135. The Court
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further observed, in pertinent part, that " . . . Congress rejected measures designed to curb
the Corps' jurisdiction in large part because of its concern that protection of wetlands
would be unduly hampered by a narrowed definition of 'navigable waters.'" Id. at 137.
"As the House Report explained; "'Navigable waters' as used in section 301 includes all
of the waters of the United States including their adjacent wetlands." IcL at 138.
As indicated above, Defendant's position that a "navigable water" must be capable
of sustaining boat traffic under the Clean Water Act is obviously wrong. And, where
there is a hydrological connection to a water of the United States, such as the Great Salt
Lake, the Army Corp of Engineers would clearly have jurisdiction over those wetlands
under the Clean Water Act. The next case, Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971),
dealt with fee ownership of the shorelands and beds underlying the waters of the Great
Salt Lake. Accordingly, that case has no relevance to federal jurisdiction over adjacent
wetlands, or to the exercise of federal power under the commerce clause. Lastly, State
Dep't of Highways v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Company, 789 P.2d 1088 (Colo.
1990) is likewise irrelevant. In that case, the state of Colorado brought an eminent
domain proceeding to condemn a private way of necessity over railroad tracks. The
Colorado Supreme Court held, as to the State Department of Highways, that it did not
have statutory authority to condemn a private way of necessity over railroad tracks of a
landlocked sheep ranch operator. By contrast, in this case, UDOT does not seek to
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acquire property for the benefit of a private party, but is instead seeking property for
mitigation purposes as authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102.
CONCLUSION
Based on the 2001 Legislative Amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102,
Defendant's property may properly be taken for mitigation. The language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, and well-established legal precedent requires that the statute be
liberally construed in furtherance of its stated purpose. With regard to whether the taking
was pursuant to an authorized public use, the District Court found that Defendant's
property met the required selection criteria and that the taking was requisite and
reasonably necessary based on an extensive record of unrebutted evidence and expert
testimony considered at hearing. Inasmuch as Defendant has failed to marshal the
evidence or to provide any reasoned bases in support of its arguments, the decision and
findings of the District Court should be affirmed. Plaintiff therefore respectfully seeks
this Court's affirmance of the District Court's decision and findings.
Respectfully submitted this 3 k 7day of July, 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

EDWARD O. OGILVIE *
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

b-7
TRANSCRIPTION OF TAPES OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE
ON SENATE BILL 256, SESSION 2001
Transcribed by George K. Fadel
PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE:
Senate Bill 256, Transportation Amendment.
Senator Knudsen:
Senate Bill 256 basically does two things: it allows for the
Department of Transportation to acquire rights of way for public
transit projects, and it also addresses the fact and gives UDOT
authority to condemn property for mitigation purposes associated
with the highway project. I might talk a little bit about examples
of mitigation—property for construction of a pedestrian overpass;
domestic animal or wild life crossings; wetland protection or
replacementf property for noise reduction; water well protection;
historic property protection; archeological and paleontological
resources protection and a combination of recreation uses such as
bikes or off-road vehiclesf parks and sidewalks.

Those are some

of the mitigation issues.
Any questions?

Questions of Senator Knudsen?

Senator Brandel: I don't have any question. I'd like to stand in
support of this bill.

Many of you know that for several years I

served on the Public Transit Authority Board and one of the
problems that we have, whether you are for or against public
transit, one of the issues is whether or not we will be able to
build these systems or whether a citizen ought to be able to hold
us hostage as a community in acquiring property. Nowf I'm opposed
to condemnation and opposed to that process but I believe that this
1

bill will solve a probJLem.

If I am not mistaken, Senator Knudsen,

when we built the Trax project there were several instances where
a city or town committed to use their eminent domain—they put it
in writing that they would use their eminent domain and then
subsequently reneged on that.

And this doesn't give carte blanche

to do anything but it does provide a mechanism in those rare cases
where it is important, so I rise in support of this.
Any other questions of Senator Knudsen?

(Knudsen):

Seeing

no further questions, Mr. President, I move under suspension of the
rules that Senate Bill 256 be considered read for the second and
third time and be up for final passage.
doing that.

(Knudsen):

(President):

We're not

I rescind my motion and restate it.

move that Senate Bill 256 be read for the third time.

I

Roll call.

Senate Bill 256 has received 24 aye votes, no nay votes, 2 senators
absent passes to the third reading calendar.

We now go to Senate

bill 226.
Next hearing;
Senate bill 256, Transportation Amendment, Senator Knudsen.
Knudsen:
Amendment

Thank

basically

you, Mr. President.
does

two

The

things.

It

Transportation
modifies

the

transportation code by allowing the Department of Transportation
to acquire rights of way for public transportation projects and it
clarifies that UDOT has the authority to condemn property

for

mitigation purposes associated with a highway project. That is the
purpose of the bill.
Questions of Senator Knudsen on this bill?
2

Seeing none.

Seeing no questions, Mr. President, I move that Senate Bill
256 be up for final passage.

Vote:

Senate Bill 256 having

received 26 aye votes, no nay votes, and three being absent, passes
and will be referred to the House. Next we will deal with Senate
Bill 226.
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PROCEEDINGS, IN THE UTAH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON SENATE BILL 256
2001 SESSION
Transcriber:

George K. Fadel

Transportation Amendment.

Senator Knudsen, Senator Bush

Thank you f

Mr. Speaker.

Senate Bill 256 is a Transportation

Amendment.

It's more or less of a housekeeping item.

It modifies

the Motor Transportation Code to in areas in which it scratches out
highways and puts transportation purposes. In other words, instead
of saying State Highways, says State Transportation purposes to
include more things in it.

And another thing it is doing is

including mitigation in this part of their duties in things they
do to acquire rights of way and mostly that's it.

Another part

saying the property acquired for public transit projects shall be
transferred to the public district responsible for the project.
It's just more of less updating a few things that they need to have
in the statute.

So with that I am ready for a few questions.

Representative Dillary:
my name.

I'd like to make an amendment under

Amendment 2 f dated February 27.

What this does if

approved by two-thirds of the member, it provides, an immediate
date to allow UDOT to deal with some issues right now as it relates
to mitigation.

Further discussion of the motion to amend?

Representative Bush:

I never heard of it before.

In fact I

didn't know about this bill until about five minutes ago but I
would certainly think that Representative Dillary is presenting his
as something that I would think would be fine with the sponsor of
the

bill.

Further

discussion

to the motion
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to

amend?

The

amendment

for

summation,

further discussion.
I'll

waive

summation.

Representative Dillary's name.
amend say aye.
amended.

Representative
It

is

Dillary

Amendment

for

#2

in.

Those in favor of the motion to

Opposed say no.

Motion passes.

Further discussion of the bill as amended.

Bill will be
Senator Bush,

back to you for summation.
Senator Bush:

Thank.

I believe I have said enough about

this, so I ask for a favorable vote.
Thank you.

Voting is open on Senate Bill 256 as amended.
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